Are volunteers workers now? Lessons and tips for employers after Maritime and Coastguard Agency

In March 2025, the Charities Aid Foundation's 'UK Giving Report' estimated that around 5.6m adults volunteered for a charity in 2024. For many charities, volunteers are an essential part of their ability to deliver services for their beneficiaries. People provide their time to support the cause of that charity and, generally, do so at no cost, or simply claim expenses, and in turn do not typically acquire statutory employment rights.

The Court of Appeal's recent decision in Maritime and Coastguard Agency v Groom has therefore caused concern within much of the third sector. In this case, the court found that Mr Groom, ostensibly a volunteer, was in fact a worker. That meant he was entitled to, for example, holiday pay, the national minimum wage and whistleblower protections.

Here, we set out why the court reached its decision, what charities (and other employers using volunteers) can do about it, and our view that this is not quite the reckoning for volunteers that it might seem.

Background

Mr Groom was, from 1985 until 2020, one of approximately 3,100 Coastguard Rescue Officers (CROs). In this role, he was part of the Coastguard Rescue Service, comprising around 325 rescue teams across the country. The Maritime and Coastguard Agency (the MCA) went to great lengths in its internal documents to state that CROs were volunteers, not workers.

The claim arose after Mr Groom was required to attend a disciplinary meeting. If Mr Groom was a worker, he would have had a statutory right to be accompanied at that meeting. The Employment Tribunal found he was not a worker, but the Employment Appeal Tribunal (EAT) disagreed. The Court of Appeal had to decide whether the EAT was correct. It was noted this was a 'test case', with potentially significant consequences should the 3,100 CROs, and other volunteers in the third sector, be found to have worker status.

When is a volunteer actually a worker?

The central question for the court to decide was whether, when Mr Groom attended a shift, a worker contract existed between him and the MCA. It considered a range of factors, but key were:

• The MCA's arrangement with CROs was one of paid volunteering. CROs were entitled, after attending a shift, to claim remuneration to compensate them "for any disruption to your personal life and employment". That remuneration was not just for expenses, but was paid above the national minimum wage, with payslips provided and, when appropriate, P45 and P60 documents. Compensating someone for inconvenience caused to their personal time is characteristic of a 'wage-work bargain' and indicative of a contractual relationship.
• Though the MCA's Volunteer Handbook, Code of Conduct and Remuneration Document stated that CROs were volunteers, that did not reflect the reality of the practice between the parties.
• When CROs attended a shift, they were required to comply with reasonable instructions whilst on duty, and in exchange, the MCA was required to pay them if it received a claim for remuneration for their attendance. There was, accordingly, an intention to form a contract.
• The parallels in existing decisions of the Supreme Court concerning Uber drivers and football referees, which emphasise that the reality of the working relationship will override any contractual labels used by the parties (you can read more about the latter in our previous article: Recent developments in employment law: two Supreme Court decisions which look beyond the contract of employment).

The court found that CROs, including Mr Groom, were workers within the meaning of s.230(3)(b) Employment Rights Act 1996 when attending activities for which they were entitled to claim remuneration.

Practical recommendations for employers using volunteers

This case highlights a number of key principles for organisations to bear in mind when engaging volunteers:

1. If a volunteer is provided remuneration for their time, over and above the reimbursement of expenses, it may give rise to a binding wage-work contract.
2. Someone may be a worker for the duration of a specific engagement only.
3. The fact that work is optional, and there is no overarching obligation to offer or accept work outside of specific engagements, does not preclude worker status during those engagements.
4. Labelling someone a 'volunteer' is not determinative.
5. The presence of control, expectations around compliance and performance, minimum attendance obligations, powers to discipline and compulsory training increase the risk of worker status.

Realistically, we expect that the number of charities who are providing payment for volunteers to compensate them for their time will be low, particularly outside of similar sectors like mountain rescue and other emergency response charities. However, it is worth at this stage making sure that your documents reflect the reality of the arrangement with volunteers:

• Review your expenses policy to see if it is truly limited to reimbursement of expenses (which the court confirmed will not make someone a worker) or if it could be construed as providing remuneration for work done.
• Check associated documents, such as your volunteer policy and any code of conduct for volunteers, to make sure that the expectations placed on volunteers do not more closely align with those on workers.
• Make sure your papers and policies truly reflect the reality of the situation. Simply stating a person is a volunteer will not make it the case.

What is the significance of this decision for charities relying on volunteers?

We have some sympathy for what appears to have been the MCA's intention to recognise the value of its CROs by paying them for their time and expertise. On its face, this decision is another example of courts or tribunals being willing to extend the rights of 'workers' to 'volunteers' in the charity sector – following the EAT's decision that charity trustees may, in some circumstances, be protected as whistleblowers, which we have written about previously: Extending whistleblowing protection to charity trustees.

However, in our view, the decision in Maritime and Coastguard Agency is much more a straightforward application of established law, including the reiteration of the principle that what is written down won't necessarily be determinative. In this case, the specific way the MCA organised its relationship with volunteers and expressly provided them with remuneration, was treated as a wage-work bargain and therefore a worker contract for the periods worked.

For that reason, this judgment does not mean all volunteers are now workers. Whilst it is sensible for organisations who use volunteers (especially rescue charities) to review existing volunteer documents and practices, many in the third sector can take comfort that genuine volunteering arrangements remain unaffected.

This publication is a general summary of the law. It should not replace legal advice tailored to your specific circumstances.

© Farrer & Co LLP, February 2026