COVID and conspiracy in the courts: Bridgen v Hancock and the boundaries of online political discourse

In the ongoing defamation proceedings between Andrew Bridgen and Matt Hancock, the High Court has once again been asked to navigate the fraught intersection of political speech, social media, and defamation law. The case centres on a tweet by former Health Secretary Mr Hancock, posted in response to controversial comments made by Mr Bridgen, the former Conservative MP, about the COVID-19 vaccination programme. It raises familiar but evolving questions: When does political rhetoric engage defamation law? What are the limits of the “honest opinion” defence in this context? And how should courts assess reputational harm in the age of viral outrage?

Mrs Justice Collins Rice's recent decision to allow the claim to proceed to trial is not a finding of liability – but it is a sign that the courts are willing to scrutinise even the most politically charged speech when reputational harm is alleged.

The facts: a tweet, a Holocaust comparison, and a political fallout

In January 2023, Andrew Bridgen, then the Conservative MP for North West Leicestershire, tweeted a link to an article discussing alleged harms associated with COVID-19 vaccines. He added the now-infamous comment: “As one consultant cardiologist said to me, this is the biggest crime against humanity since the Holocaust.”

The backlash was immediate. Within hours, Matt Hancock tweeted the following text: “The disgusting and dangerous antisemitic, anti-vax, anti-scientific conspiracy theories spouted by a sitting MP this morning are unacceptable and have absolutely no place in our society.” Beneath the text was a video showing Mr Hancock asking a question about Mr Bridgen’s comments at Prime Minister’s Questions earlier in the day, in which he used similar language.

Mr Bridgen was suspended from the Conservative Party and later expelled. He subsequently joined the Reclaim Party. In 2024, he issued libel proceedings against Mr Hancock in relation to the tweet, alleging that it falsely accused him of being antisemitic and caused serious harm to his reputation. The statements made in the House of Commons by Mr Hancock could not be sued upon, as they were protected by Parliamentary Privilege, but that did not extend to the tweet. 

The legal claim: serious reputational harm and the honest opinion defence

At a previous hearing, the Court had determined that the natural and ordinary meaning of the tweet was that “An unnamed MP had said something that morning related to vaccination which was baseless, unscientific, dangerous and offensive, including because its character was antisemitic”. The sections in bold were held to be statements of opinion rather than fact. Notably, while Mr Bridgen was not named in the tweet, this does not necessarily mean he was not identified (at least to some readers by innuendo) and therefore defamed. 

Mr Hancock contests the claim on three principle grounds: (1) he argues (in part) that his tweet did not refer to Mr Bridgen; (2) he says that the tweet did not cause serious harm to Mr Bridgen’s reputation (as is required under section 1 of the Defamation Act 2013); and (3) he relies on the defence of honest opinion including in relation to the allegation that Mr Bridgen’s tweet was “antisemitic in character”.

No summary judgment – a trial awaits

In her decision, Mrs Justice Collins Rice refused Mr Hancock’s application for summary judgment. By his application, Mr Hancock argued that (1) Mr Bridgen’s claim to have suffered serious reputational harm as a result of the tweet had no real prospect of success, (2) Mr Bridgen had no real prospect of defeating Mr Hancock’s honest opinion defence; and/or (3) Mr Bridgen’s claim that Mr Hancock did not hold the opinion in question should be struck out. The threshold for such early determinations before trial is a high one, although one can certainly see why Mr Hancock pursued the application. A finding in his favour on either (1) or (2) would have meant the end of the claim. 

Serious harm

The Judge was not prepared to conclude that it was fanciful to suggest Mr Bridgen’s reputation had been caused serious harm by the tweet. First, the seriousness of the allegation, the mass publication, the high profile of the parties and the sensitivities of an election year in the wake of the pandemic were enough to form the basis of a realistic (ie more than fanciful) claim that serious reputational harm had been caused among readers who identified Mr Bridgen. Second, while Mr Hancock argued that Mr Bridgen’s own tweet – including his Holocaust comparison – had already damaged his reputation, the Judge held that this did not conclusively negate the possibility that Hancock’s tweet calling Mr Bridgen out was sufficiently influential to change readers’ minds towards Mr Bridgen in such a way as to meet the serious harm threshold.

Honest opinion

In order to successfully avail himself of the honest opinion defence in section 3 of the Defamation Act 2013, Mr Hancock must show that:

1. The statement in question is one of opinion (satisfied in relation to the reference to antisemitism – see above).
2. The statement indicated the basis of the opinion.
3. His opinion was one that an honest person could have held based on any fact which existed at the time.

Even if Mr Hancock is able to satisfy these three points, Mr Bridgen could still defeat the defence by showing that Mr Hancock did not in fact hold the opinion.

On the question of whether an honest person could have held Mr Hancock’s opinion, the Judge concluded that it was necessary to await the evidence that a trial would provide. This might include evidence that other respected commentators considered Mr Bridgen’s tweet to be antisemitic, a point Mr Hancock had sought to rely on in the application but which was not the subject of clear incontrovertible evidence at that stage. As to whether Mr Hancock held the opinion, Mr Bridgen has argued that he did not and that the allegation was instead a gratuitous bid to silence him rather than engage in debate. Again, the Judge felt that this was not a wholly unrealistic proposition and therefore needed to be dealt with at trial with full evidence from the parties.

None of the above is to say that Mr Bridgen will succeed in his claim. Indeed, it would be fair to say that Mrs Justice Collins Rice’s decision hints at the significant hurdles he is likely to face. However, the case also demonstrates the reluctance of the courts to conduct a mini-trial even when it might be reasonably obvious that one party has the better of things.

Conclusion – “blue on blue” in the High Court

It is not often that two senior politicians go head-to-head in legal proceedings and less frequent still that such a claim reaches trial. Cross-examination, should the case proceed to trial, will undoubtedly be a spectacle, amplified by the fact they were both Members of Parliament for the same party. The case will also be a test of how the law of defamation applies to the fast-moving, emotionally charged world of online commentary by politicians where Parliamentary Privilege does not apply. If it does proceed to trial, it will also be a further important analysis of the serious harm threshold and the honest opinion defence in the environment of social media, building on the much publicised litigation last year involving Lawrence Fox and the previous decision of the Court of Appeal in Riley v Murray. Thrown into the mix will no doubt be the parties’ totally polarised views on the UK Government’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic.

Many thanks to Elisheva Joshua, a current trainee in the team, for her help preparing this article.

This publication is a general summary of the law. It should not replace legal advice tailored to your specific circumstances.

© Farrer & Co LLP, May 2025