Lessons in defamation: how the courts treated a headmaster's emails about a parent

A recent High Court ruling which thwarted a parent's attempt to sue a headteacher for libel has provided some helpful lessons about internal communications in a school context and an outline of key principles.

The parent had sued the headmaster of Kelmscott School in East London for damages over two emails he had sent to the chair of governors saying that she threatened and intimidated staff, who were very wary of her, and that he hoped not to hear from her again, "fingers crossed".

A defamation claim can be brought where a defamatory statement which refers to the claimant (for example by naming them or otherwise identifying them) is published to a third party (ie sent to one or more people other than the claimant, which here was the chair of governors).

However, even if these elements appear present, there are a number of ways that a claim can be defended, including by showing that on closer analysis one of the elements is missing or that a defence (such as truth, honest opinion or qualified privilege) would apply.

In this case, although the allegation was serious, the headteacher successfully argued that the statement did not qualify as 'defamatory' because the parent could not show that the emails had caused or were likely to cause her serious reputational harm.

Serious harm in defamation claims

Since the Defamation Act 2013, a statement cannot qualify as 'defamatory' unless it has caused or is likely to cause serious reputational harm.

The courts have ruled that, to prove 'serious harm' some evidence of the actual impact the statement had on the recipient(s) is needed, or the facts must be such that serious reputational harm can be inferred; it is not sufficient that the meaning of the statement is damaging.

The parent could not meet the serious harm test in this case because:

• although the allegation was quite a serious one to make about a parent, the headmaster had only sent the email to one person (the chair of governors), meaning that 'publication' was extremely limited (in fact to the bare minimum necessary of one publishee);
• whilst the law recognises that "one well-directed arrow [may] hit the bull's eye of reputation", in this case there was no evidence that the chair's view of the claimant had been adversely affected;
• the chair was already involved in assessing complaints by the parent and would know that tempers can run high and that strong allegations can be made on both sides, but they are expected to keep an open mind;
• the allegations in the emails were peripheral to the background dispute and it was reasonable to expect that a chair of governors would have been able to concentrate on the matters actually in issue; and
• the allegation that "she threatens and intimidates" was very vague and conversational in tone, rather than going into specifics.

As a result, the court struck out the claim, saving the headmaster and his school from the stress and expense of a protracted legal claim, although perhaps wishing he had paused before pressing 'send' or used more diplomatic language.

Freedom of Information and Data Protection

Whilst on this occasion the libel claim was short-lived, it illustrates the risk of sending disparaging emails when the subject may well have grounds to obtain a copy, for example (where the school is a state school) using the Freedom of Information Act, as was the case here, or (whether it is a state or private school) by means of a Data Subject Access Request under the Data Protection Act 2018.

Whilst self-censorship is not always necessary or appropriate, it is worth pausing to ask whether it is necessary or desirable to put those particular words into writing and to the chosen recipients. It may be that if the content is defamatory, a defence to defamation may apply – but reflection is warranted in view of the potential relational, reputational and financial consequences that come with getting sued, even if the claim is ultimately defeated.

Qualified privilege in a school context

Although the case did not explore this (because the claim was struck out), the judge commented that the headmaster may have had a strong defence of privilege, had the claim proceeded.

The privilege defence can protect communications which are sent to limited recipients where the sender believes they have a duty to impart the information in question and the recipient(s) has/have a corresponding interest in receiving it.

The dynamic of duty and interest can create a privileged 'occasion' where the sender of the defamatory statement is protected, because the law recognises that it is in the public interest for information to be able to flow freely in certain situations without people being afraid of getting sued.

In this scenario the headmaster could have argued he was under a duty to warn the chair about the parent's alleged behaviour and that the chair had the necessary corresponding interest in receiving it because she was dealing with the complaint (and presumably the parent).

The privilege is 'qualified' because the sender must not 'abuse' the occasion or speak in excess of privilege by going too far in what they say, sending the communication to too many recipients or sending the communication with an improper motive.

In a school context this defence could protect the internal sharing of concerns between staff, for example relating to a child's welfare or staff or parent conduct.

It can also protect communications sent externally to limited and appropriate recipients, such as to a Local Authority, Ofsted, regulators or inspectorates.

It is perfectly understandable that members of staff might feel upset about emotive events and wish to express their frustrations. However, communications that could be described as unprofessional (even if sent with sound intentions) are best expressed verbally given the potential for their subsequent disclosure. This is less about whether such communications are unlawful, and more about their capacity to pose a serious nuisance factor down the line.

This publication is a general summary of the law. It should not replace legal advice tailored to your specific circumstances.

© Farrer & Co LLP, May 2026