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The final countdown: the Renters' Rights Act and limitation

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residential houses

It is no secret that from 1 May 2026, with the dawn of the Renters' Rights Act 2025 (the RRA), notices under section 21 of the Housing Act 1988 (the HA) will be of no effect. The speculation is that, as the deadline approaches, an avalanche of last-minute section 21 notices will be served, and the already overburdened county court system will face a sharp spike in accelerated possession claims.

Pursuant to section 21(4D) of the HA and paragraph 4 of Schedule 6 to the RRA, those claims must be 'begun' by the earlier of:

  • six months from the date the section 21 notice was given; or
  • 31 July 2026.

What does 'begun' mean in these circumstances? And following this, how might the anticipated influx of accelerated possession claims in response to the RRA influence parties' tactics when 'beginning' proceedings?

Let's start at the 'beginning'

The standard position is that proceedings are 'started' when the court issues a claim form at the request of a claimant. However, where the claim form is received in the court office before the date on which it is issued, the claim is 'brought' for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1980 (the LA) and any other relevant statute on that date.

So, for a claimant bringing a claim subject to the LA or a statute that refers to 'brought', proceedings are started when the claim is filed with the court.

How does that square with the reference to 'begun' in the HA? Has a landlord 'begun' proceedings when lodging a claim? Or must the landlord have received an issued and sealed claim form from the court for proceedings to have 'begun'?

Case law on when possession proceedings are 'begun'

There is case law to support the idea that for the purposes of section 21(4D) of the HA, the possession claim should be treated as having 'begun' when issued by the court.

In Salford City Council v Garner, the Court of Appeal determined when proceedings were 'begun' for the purposes of the Housing Act 1996, Part V. It concluded that there was a distinction between when proceedings were ‘brought’ and when proceedings were ‘begun’. As Maurice Kay LJ stated:

"…Mr Moore draws attention to para [5.1] of the Practice Direction... [he] submits that the present situation is analogous to that specific provision which is based on the Limitation Act and the wording of when a claim is 'brought'.

In my judgment, there is no such analogy. That specific provision is... based on earlier authority decided in the context of the bringing of proceedings for the purposes of the Limitation Act. Here the language in issue is not the 'bringing of proceedings' but the 'beginning of proceedings'. Where there is a general provision aimed at a point of time at which proceedings are started, it follows that the assimilation of when proceedings are begun and when they are started is conclusive. The extended meaning, given specifically in the context of the bringing of proceedings for the purposes of the Limitation Act, has no bearing on the present circumstances…"

In other words, the exception provided for a deadline under the LA does not apply because the statutory reference is to 'begun', not 'brought'.

Ideal Shopping Direct Ltd v Visa Europe Ltd supports this conclusion. At paragraph 33, it was held:

"…[P]aragraph 5.1 of PD7A shows that the general rule is that the claim is not taken to be issued on the date on which the proposed claim form is received by the court office. The exception provided for by paragraph 5.1 of PD7A applies for the purposes of the Limitation Act 1980 and any other statute which refers to proceedings being 'brought': see Barnes v St Helens MBC… The exception in paragraph 5.1 does not apply where the relevant statute does not refer to the 'bringing of proceedings' but refers instead to 'the beginning of proceedings': see Salford City Council v Garner…"

In light of these authorities and given that (i) the LA does not apply here; and (ii) the reference in section 21(4D) of the HA is to 'begun', not 'brought', it is arguable (at the very least) that a claim for possession pursuant to a section 21 notice is only validly 'begun' if issued within six months of the date the notice was given, or accounting for the RRA, by 31 July 2026 (whichever is earlier).

Practical advice for landlords before the RRA deadlines

If correct, this means parties are at the mercy of the court as to when proceedings are 'begun'. Predicting when a county court will issue a claim form is a game of chance. It could be two weeks; it could be several months depending on how overburdened the centre you are using is. It is possible that a significant increase in accelerated possession claims in response to the RRA will only exacerbate this issue.

Landlords should therefore consider:

  • serving section 21 notices sooner rather than later to avoid having the period to have 'begun' proceedings (if required) limited by the RRA's 31 July 2026 cut-off; and
  • having proceedings ready to file as soon as the deadline in a section 21 notice expires. This will maximise the time available for the court to issue the claim and ensure that proceedings are 'begun' as soon as possible.

If landlords do fall foul of this, the Court of Appeal authority of Harrison v University Hospitals Coventry & Warwickshire NHS Trust suggests they will receive little sympathy from the courts (emphasis added):

"Much emphasis was placed on the position where, for example, there was industrial action at the issuing court or where (as no doubt here) the sheer volume of claim forms being submitted at the time to the relevant court caused delays in formal issue. But that kind of consideration has only attracted an exception in the context of the Limitation Acts."

As to tenants served with accelerated possession proceedings, they should carefully scrutinise the issue date of the claim. If not within six months from the date the section 21 notice was given, or by 31 July 2026 (if applicable), there could be grounds to argue that proceedings were not 'begun' in accordance with section 21(4D) of the HA.

That could have significant consequences if raised on or after 1 May 2026, by which point a landlord will not be able to re-serve a section 21 notice to remedy the position.

This publication is a general summary of the law. It should not replace legal advice tailored to your specific circumstances.

© Farrer & Co LLP, March 2026

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About the authors

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Graham Anderson

Senior Counsel

Graham advises a wide range of clients including landowners, developers, educational institutions, private banks and UHNWIs, across all aspects of commercial, residential and agricultural contentious property work, including property-related professional negligence. He also has experience across the full range of construction disputes, including adjudication, arbitration and litigation in the Technology and Construction Court.

Graham advises a wide range of clients including landowners, developers, educational institutions, private banks and UHNWIs, across all aspects of commercial, residential and agricultural contentious property work, including property-related professional negligence. He also has experience across the full range of construction disputes, including adjudication, arbitration and litigation in the Technology and Construction Court.

Email Graham +44 (0)20 3375 7404
Will Johnson lawyer

William Johnson

Associate

William acts for a wide range of clients concerning all types of property. William has a particular interest in acting in rural land disputes, especially those concerning mines and minerals, telecommunications and ‘drone trespass’. He has experience of conducting litigation in the County Court and High Court, as well as using methods of alternative dispute resolution where appropriate, eg negotiation or mediation.

William acts for a wide range of clients concerning all types of property. William has a particular interest in acting in rural land disputes, especially those concerning mines and minerals, telecommunications and ‘drone trespass’. He has experience of conducting litigation in the County Court and High Court, as well as using methods of alternative dispute resolution where appropriate, eg negotiation or mediation.

Email William +44 (0)20 3375 7699

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